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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
SAMUEL BRECKENRIDGE NOTE PRIZE AWARDS
The Samuel Breckenridge Law Review Note Prize of fifteen
dollars for the best note in the final number of Volume XIII has
been awarded to Joseph Nessenfeld for his note on "Remova-
bility Where Resident Co-Defendant Is Not Served."
The additional Samuel Breckenridge Prize of ten dollars for
the best note in Volume XIII has been awarded to Abraham E.
Margolin for his note on "Liability of Employer Under Work-
men's Compensation Act for Accidents Sustained by Employee
on Way to or From Work," which was adjudged best in the first
issue and awarded the prize for that issue.
The notes in Volume XIII were judged by a special committee,
consisting of Messrs. Ralph R. Neuhoff, John M. Holmes, and
Harry W. Kroeger, who are also members of the Law Review
Advisory Committee.
JURISDICTION IN ACTIONS IN REM AND IN PERSONAM
Suppose Mr. Jones, who is a resident of Illinois, has broken a
contract giving Mr. Smith a right of action. The latter is a
resident of Missouri; but, because Jones has no property in that
state and because he remains in Illinois, Smith's right of action
is worthless unless he cross over into Illinois and sue there.
Such is the result of the rules of law today. That there is no
logical reason for this rule is the fact which this note seeks to
establish.*
It is necessary that the present law be given in order to make
comprehensible the fact that in the above situation Smith's right
is without a remedy in Missouri.
In law there are two general classes of actions and judgments,
i. e., in personam and in rem. Another form of action has been
designated as an action quasi in rem, but this in theory comes
under the other classes, and it will be considered later. An ac-
tion in personam is one the judgment of which in form as well
as in substance, affects the interests of the parties., It is, as one
court phrases it, against a person, founded on the defendant's
liability.2 The judgment binds only the parties litigant. There
* There are.a number of considerations which this note will not treat.
Such problems as due process, the divorce question, etc., are specific impedi-
ments in the path of the plan to be suggested in the note. For example,
it would entail a complete reconstruction of the present conception of due
process. The author's intention is to present some of the bases for his.
-view, and not to treat of detail; that would necessitate a volume, at least.1 Hine v. Hussey (1871), 45 Ala. 496, 515; Allen v. Morris (1870), 34
N. J. L. 159, 162; Woodruff v. Taylor (1847), 20 Vt. 65, 73; Stiller v. Atchi-
son R. Co. (1912), 34 Okla. 45, 124 P. 545, 598.Gassert v. Strong (1908), 38 Mont. 18, 33.
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is little difficulty in arriving at a definition of an action in per-
sonam; but a definition of actions in rem has caused a great deal
of confusion, probably because the courts themselves are not
clear as to the meaning of the term. An action in rem is one
whose judgment is an official decree of the status of a thing as
it concerns persons. It is binding on every interested party.
Not all decisions have framed the definition exactly like this one,
but in general the trend has been at least an attempt at it.3 The
fact that the law has recognized a distinction between these two
kinds of actions has given rise to a difference in the forms and
procedure of them. One of the chief differences is the distinc-
tion in jurisdictional requirements; and in a system of divided
sovereignty, where the jurisdiction of a sister state is the decid-
ing factor of whether the state of the forum will recognize a
foreign judgment, these distinctions in jurisdictional require-
ments are especially important.
Jurisdiction is the power and the legal authority to declare
what is law in a given situation.4 The legal authority, in a
sense, rests on the power. It has been declared that the ulti-,
mate basis of jurisdiction is the physical power to enforce the
court's decree. 5 In another sense the word jurisdiction is used
to indicate the proper exercise of power, so that foreign states
will recognize and enforce the decree. That is the more humane
and civilized kind of jurisdiction, and it is the kind which is
necessary under the due process clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion. Yet it must be admitted that the final authority is not
legal but physical; even if another state enforces a foreign judg-
ment, its power to do so rests in practice on the power to compel
the defendant physically. However, we shall treat of jurisdic-
tion in its humane or international sense. Jurisdiction for an
action in rem is obtained by getting the property or the thing
within the control of the court. For an action in personam the
defendant must be in court, or at least he should have been ap-
prised of the proceedings and should have had an opportunity
to get his day in court.6 But physical control of the defendant
is not absolutely necessary in an in personam action. What Mr.
Justice Holmes calls the "decencies of civilization" has given
'Mankin v. Chandler (1823), 2 Brock. 125; Woodruff v. Taylor (1847),
20 Vt. 65; The Sabine (1879), 101 U. S. 384, 388; Freeman v. Alderson
(1886), 119 U. S. 185, 7 Sup. Rep. 165; Windsor v. McVeigh (1876), 93
U. S. 274, 279; The J. W. French (1882), 13 Tex. 916; Lord v. Chadbourne
(1856), 42 Me. 428, 443; 3 Freeman, JUDGMENTS, p. 3109; 2 Black, JuDG-
MENTS, Sec. 793.
' 1 Black, JUDGMENTS, Sec. 3220.
' The Belgenland (1885), 114 U. S. 355; McDonald v. Mabee (1917), 243
U. S. 90, L. R. A. 1917F, 458.
"Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. 714.
' Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry (1913), 228 U. S. 346.
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rise to a few other bases of jurisdiction. Thus a valid judg-
ment may be obtained against an absent defendant, if service
of process is had at his domicile.8 Also, a defendant who has con-
sented to the jurisdiction of a court cannot afterwards escape
the force of its decree., And under the police power of a state
a new basis of jurisdiction has arisen in the case of transient
motorists passing through the state.10 But this will be con-
sidered more fully later.
Disregarding for the moment any historical reasons, what are
the bases for the jurisdictional requirements in actions in rem?
The first consideration is the limitations of the state's sover-
eignty to the boundaries of its territory. No state will issue a
nugatory decree. The object of the judgment must be within
the state, so that the decree can be made effective. It would be
foolish for a New York court to adjudicate the status of land
located in Missouri. The sovereign power of New York ends
with its boundaries; it does not reach within the state of Mis-
souri. And not only will that latter state refuse to enforce the
,New York decree, but it will deny its validity because of the
lack of jurisdictional requirements. 1i The practical result of
this jurisdictional requirement is beneficial in that it gives a
plaintiff a means of enforcing his right against the defendant
even when the latter is out of the state, if, however, he owns
property within the state. And that is a good thing. Other-
wise, the defendant could.be immune to legal process merely by
removing himself to another state. At present he must remove
his property, too, which is much more difficult.
The power to coerce the defendant is one reason for the juris-
dictional requirement of his being within the state in actions
in personam. If Jones remains in Illinois a Missouri judgment
is a nullity even within the state of Missouri. The limitations
of sovereignty are equally as valid in the case of persons as in
'Henderson v. Stanfard (1870), 105 Mass. 504, 7 Am. Rep. 551; but serv-
ice at the defendant's technical domicile has been held insufficient; McDon-
ald v. Mabee, supra, note 5.
'Hazel v. Jacobs (1910), 78 N. J. L. 459, 75 A. 903, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1066, 20 Ann. Cas. 260.
"Hess v. Palowski (1925), 247 U. S. 352. See also 14 ST. Louis L. REv.
62.
" Wimer v. Wimer (1888), 82 Va. 890, 5 S. E. 536, 3 Am. St. Rep. 126.
Even where the parties litigant are in court, the judgment may neverthe-
less be ineffective because the property affected is not within the jurisdic-
tion of the court. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri (1912), 224 U. S. 270,
Ann. Cas. 1913D 936; Chicago, B. and Q. Ry. Co. v. Chicago (1897), 166
U. S. 226; Graves v. Smith (1919), 278 Mo. 592, 213 S. W. 128, held that
where the method prescribed by statute for attaching the property is not
followed, it is not technically brought into court, and is not within the
court's jurisdiction. For actions in rem in admira lity see Freeman on
JUDGMENTS, p. 3125 et seq.
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the case of things. 12 Then, too, there is to be considered the
"due process" qualification. The old doctrine of hearing both
sides of the controversy before rendering judgment operates to
require due notice to be given to the defendant. Pennoyer v.
Neff" tried to settle what uncertainty there had been in the law
before 1877. Why, then, should there be made an exception
permitting valid jurisdiction to be had by service of process at
the defendant's domicile without service upon the defendant
himself? Pure convenience and necessity are the reasons for
that. If a defendant is not to be served at his domicile, where
can he be served? It is to be noted here that the courts have
made an exception to the ordinary jurisdictional requirement on
no more logical grounds than necessity and convenience. Again,
since the legal authority for the court to exercise its power on
the defendant depends a good deal on his being apprised of the
suit, a previous consent to the jurisdiction answers that
requisite. Also, where a defendant has been served and absents
himself from the state the court is not deprived of its jurisdic-
tion over him.14 The reason for this rule is that since the de-
fendant was at the moment of serving within the power of the
state he could have been incarcerated and held until the decree.
The fact that this was not done should not invalidate the judg-
ment, because the defendant himself was benefited by the hu-
mane action of the state. Note, too, that here the "decency of
civilization" operates to give validity to an otherwise invalid
basis for jurisdiction.
There remains to be considered the basis of jurisdiction in the
cases of transient motorists. We can discard the notion of
physical power because the defendant is out of the state; we can
even assume that he had no actual notice of the suit. The
Massachusetts statute which was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in the Hess casel4 a was to the effect that a non-
resident, operating a vehicle within the state, shall be considered
to have appointed a public officer as his attorney for service of
process. 15 In its holding the Court said that the basis for thejurisdiction was the implied consent of the defendant. That,
however, we need to consider. What is an implied consent?
It is most often no consent at all but a declaration by the court
as to what the consent must be. Pennoyer v. Neff16 implies that
jurisdiction of a partnership may be based on implied consent.
" McDonald v. Mabee, supra, note 5; Wetmore v. Karrick (1907), 205
U. S. 141.
"(1877), 95 U. S. 714.
Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, supra, note 7. An appeal is considered
merely a continuance of the same suit, and the defendant need not be
served again. Nations v. Johnson (1860), 24 How. 95, 16 L. ed. 628.
"Mass. Gen. Laws, Chap. 90, amended stat. 1923, Chap. 431, Sec. 2.
"95 U. S. 1. c. 735.
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But there is no indication of an extension of that principle to
cases of tort. However, that consideration does not make the
holding in the Hess case wrong. It would seem to be perfectly
just that a right of civil recovery for torts committed by tran-
sient motorists be given to citizens of Massachusetts or of any
other state. The real ground for jurisdiction is perhaps the
police power of the state in regulating the use and operation of
a dangerous instrumentality, the machine; but behind even this
reason lies, it seems, the consideration of practical expediency.
The plaintiff ought to be able to recover without following the
defendant to get service on him. The defendant may be a tour-
ist from California; then the plaintiff might find it necessary to
spend a season chasing the defendant in order to serve him
personally.
The situation where the defendant is absent had been met
partially at common law. By the time of Blackstone the pro-
cess of outlawry had been extended to defendants in civil
actions.17 Previously, of course, outlawry was a dread thing,
resulting in death to the outlaw and a forfeiture of all his goods
to the crown. It lay for treason and other various felonies.
Later it was extended to include most criminal cases, and in
Bracton's time there was a tendency to permit it in civil cases.
The fear of this process usually resulted in causing the defend-
ant to consider seriously the advisability of meeting the plain-
tiff's legal contentions in court rather than running away.
American courts, however, refused to allow outlawry. The
result was that where a defendant absconded but left property
in the state, the plaintiff was left in the exasperating position
of holding a valid claim and being permitted only to look on this
property with which he could (but not legally) satisfy this
right. That is the reason for statutory attachment suits, some-
times called actions quasi in rem.18 This procedure, which
originated in the custom of London, is very common in the
United States: almost every state has statutes providing for
it. 19 The plaintiff, even where the obligation is in personam, as
for contract, attaches the defendant's property at the institution
of the proceedings. Then, after judgment, he can levy execu-
tion against the property brought into court. That is the gist
of the proceedings. But the exact nature of the judgment and
action demands a little consideration.
Against whom or what is the action brought, the defendant
or his property? It must be remembered that actions in
personam will lie, and that is the type of case we will consider;
13 Blackstone 284; 2 Pollock and Maitland; HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW,
p. 578, see also pages 447, 591, 470.Hill v. Henry (1904), 66 N. J. Eq. 150, 57 Atl. 554.
See, for a typical example, R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 1725 et seq.
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for, where the action is against the property (i. e., in rem),
statutory attachment is not necessary. The action, then, is in
personam, against the defendant . 2  But since the defendant
cannot be served, the judgment cannot be good against him.
Obviously then, the judgment must be against the property.2
An action quasi in rem, then, is one, which, though brought
against a person, seeks to subject only certain of his property
to the discharge of the claims asserted.22  No property but that
brought into the cognizance of the court by the proceedings is
subject to the plaintiff's right. And, too, it must be noted that
the judgment in this kind of suit is different from the judgment
in rem in that it is binding only between the plaintiff and the
defendant. If the plaintiff through mistake proceeds against
the property of one other than the defendant, the adjudication
of the court is invalid as to that property. The plaintiff acts at
his peril in designating the property to be attached.
The fact that in an attachment proceeding the defendant is
out of the state eliminates physical power over the defendant as
a basis of jurisdiction. Of course, the property is under the
control of the state; but, it must be remembered, the property is
not the subject of the suit; and the judgment in theory is against
the defendant. What, then, is the basis for jurisdiction in at-
tachment proceedings? No lawyer would hesitate to answer
that pure expediency and practicability necessitate the action.
Here is the situation: the plaintiff has a valid claim against the
defendant; here is property belonging to the defendant; the
court will therefore grant relief to the plaintiff in spite of the
fact that the defendant is not in the state. And it is just that
this should be so. The law has so far advanced today as to be
able to recognize the impending effect of unnecessary formality.
The historical aspect of actions in rem might help in determin-
ing what our opinion of them should be. The generally ac-
cepted view is that actions in rem started in the Roman Law and
were taken over into the common law from civil jurisprudence.
But at the time of the Norman Conquest of England there were
still traces of the Roman noxal action existing in Anglo-Saxon
law. Between the time of the Romans in England and the
eleventh century, there was ample opportunity for tribal custom
to have combined with Roman law. Pollock and Maitland 23 re-
fer to the situation where "men worked together in a forest, and
by chance one let a tree fall on another, and it killed him. The
tree belonged to the dead man's kinsfolk. A man whose beast
wounded another might surrender the animal as an alternative
Hill v. Henry, supra, note 18.
Lovejoy v. Albee (1851), 3 Me. 414, 55 Am. Dec. 630.
Freeman v. Alderson (1886), 119 U. S. 185, 187; 1 Black, JUDGMENTS,
Sec. 229.
" HISToRY OF ENGLISH LAW, 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 55.
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for money compensation." This seems to indicate the existence
of a time in Anglo-Saxon law when inanimate objects (and ani-
mals, too) were tried in lawsuits as defendants. We know that
such was the dictate of Biblical law, at least in regard to
animals, 24 and that primitive Greek law had a kind of proceed-
ing against animals or things.2 5 There is little doubt but that
all primitive thought regarded the immediate cause of an injury
as capable of being tried in a lawsuit. How might our action
in rem have developed from such thought?
Justice Holmes28 presents a discussion of the growth of actions
against a ship. There is first of all, he points out, the concep-
tion of the liability, or at least wrongful action, of the thing or
person last connected with the injured one. To this thought
there came the idea that there must have been some kind of
motion, perhaps to enable the mind to read animation into the
thing. The reader sees how motion gives life to the guilty ob-
ject which is to be forfeited.
"The most striking example of this sort is a ship. And ac-
cordingly, the old books say that, if a man falls from a ship and
is drowned, the motion of the ship must be taken to cause the
death, the ship is forfeited-" There follows a discussion of
the idea that if one assumes that the ship is endowed with life
and personality the law at once becomes intelligible. In the
case of The Ticonderoga,27 a collision took place under such cir-
cumstances that the owner of the boat was free from liability.
"Yet it is perfectly settled that there is a lien on his vessel for
the amount of the damage done, and this means that that vessel
may be arrested and sold to pay the loss in any admiralty court
whose process will reach her." The Supreme Court of the
United States held a boat liable where she was in charge of a
pilot whose employment was made compulsory by the laws of
the port she was entering.28  Without going into maritime law,
the purpose of this brief historical paragraph is to advance the
view that perhaps the action in rem today is a vestige of primi-
tive notions. Nobody today looks on a boat as the offender
where a passenger has fallen off and has drowned.
But the writer does not wish to be interpreted to mean that
the action in rem should be abolished because it has primitive
origins. Rather we should realize that actions in rem and in
2 Exod. XXI. 28.
" See "CoM.MON LAW" by Justice Holmes, especially the chapter on "Early
Forms of Liability."
"Op. cit. p. 25 et seq.
Swably, 215, 217.
'The China (1868), 7 Wall, 53; See, also, the rest of Chap. 1 of Mr.
Justice Holmes' book for a more complete discussion of the liability of
defendants other than human beings.
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peroonam are fundamentally the same, and that formal distinc-
tions-such as jurisdictional requirements--should to some ex-
tent be abolished. Disregarding current misapprehension,
what is an action in rem? Does it really effect the status of a
thing? Is not the result of a judgment in rem similar to one in
peraonam in that the rights of persons ultimately are the things
affected? How foolish, then, to say that a decree by a court
actually changes a thing, or its status! Of course, we know
that this is another legal fiction. But what we do not realize
is that we are allowing a fiction to prevent a just proceeding, as
in the situation presented at the beginning of this note.
A judgment in rem, it is said, adjudicates a status. Thus,
the effect of the judgment is that this piece of property is obli-
gated to the plaintiff to extent of, say, $500. But how is this
different from the effect of a judgment in personam? In that
case the effect is to say that the defendant personally is obligated
to the plaintiff to the extent of $500. In each case a status of
debtor-creditor has been created by the court; and the fact that
in the one ase the debtor is a thing and in the other person of
itself makes no difference to the parties interested. In each
case the public force is pledged to the satisfying of the judg-
ment as far as is possible.29 On the other hand it is argued that
a judgment in personam is different from one in rem because the
former obligates the defendant personally, the latter merely af-
fects the property. This is true only insofar as the form of the
judgment is concerned. But consider what happens actually.
Does an in personam decree affect a person if he has no property
subject to execution? Certainly not, today-now that we have
no longer the anachronism of the debtor's prison. The ultimate
effect of a judgment in personam, in the sense of the object of its
force, is property or the sale of property, just as it is in the case
of judgment in rem. Also, the effect of this latter form of judg-
ment is said to be purely against the property. But if we look
through the outer form of the judgment we see that only the
interests of people are involved, just as in judgments in per-
sonam. Certainly, if a piece of land is sold to satisfy a judg-
ment in rem, the property of the defendant is not truly affected.
The position of the defendant with regard to that property is
changed, and he is actually impoverished to the extent of the
judgment-precisely as he would have been by execution upon
a judgment in personam. Perhaps, if we regard the property
which a judgment in rem affects as being the right of user and
disposition which one may lawfully exercise ° over something,
Brigham v. Fayerweather (1885), 140 Mass. 411, 5 N. R. 265, gives a
suggestion of the inherent resemblance of both kinds of judgments.
"l Blackstone 138; Stevens and Wood v. The State (1839), 2 Ark. 291,
35 Am. Dec. 72; St. Louis v. Hill (1893), 116 Mo. 527, 533, 22 S. W. 861, 21
L. R. A. 226, and numerous cases cited therein.
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then it will be plain that only the interests of people are affected
in this judgment as well as in judgments in personam.
The case of Harris v. Balk3" is one in which the Supreme Court
in effect discarded any distinction between the two forms of
judgment. This was a garnishment case, and these have always
given the courts difficulty. Since the jurisdiction of the debt
depends on the situs of this intangible thing, various results have
been reached.3 2 The facts of the Harris case are as follows:
Harris, of North Carolina, owed Balk $300. While Harris was
in Baltimore, one Epstein caused to be issued a writ of attach-
ment against Balk, on the debt due Balk from Harris, and this
writ was properly served on Harris. He did not contest the
garnishment process, but left Baltimore and returned to North
Carolina. There he made an affidavit that he owed Balk $180
and stated that the amount had been attached by Epstein in
Baltimore. By his counsel in the Maryland proceeding Harris
consented to an order of condemnation against him as garnishee
for $180, the amount of his debt to Balk. Epstein got judgment
for $180, and Harris paid it. Later Balk commenced an action
against Harris in North Carolina for $180. Over the defend-
ant's contentions based upon the garnishment process in Mary-
land, a judgment was issued in favor of Balk for the amount
prayed for. The ground of the judgment was that the Mary-
land court had no jurisdiction to attach or garnish the debt due
from Harris to Balk, because Harris was but temporarily in the
state, and the situs of the debt was in North Carolina. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decree, holding
in effect that the garnishment process of the Maryland court was
valid. The reasoning was based on the ground that power over
the person of the garnishee confers jurisdiction on the court of
the state where the writ issues.-" The court cited Blackstone v.
Miller.
An analysis of Harrts v. Balk seems to indicate that a very
peculiar result was reached, i. e., the rights of Balk were adjudi-
cated in Maryland while he was in North Carolina, and his right
of action against Harris was annihilated. The case proceeds on
the basis that this is a garnishment suit, and is therefore in rem,
but as a matter of fact the effect is practically a judgment in
personam against a nonresident, which is afterwards valid as a
defense against a claim by him. This is the nearest the courts
have gone to obviate the distinction between actions in rem and
in personam in rights ex contractu. And we are not arguing
against this result. What we are attempting to prove is that
31 (1905), 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625, 49 L. ed. 1023, 3 Am. Cas. 1084.
, Tootle v. Coleman (1901), 107 Fed. 41, 46 C. C. H. 132, 57 L. R. A. 120;
Bates v. Railway Co. (1884), 60 Wis. 296, 19 N. A. 72, 50 Am. Rep. 369.
See note, 100 Am. Dec. 509.
"See note by Prof. Beale in 27 HARV. L. REV. 107.
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such a recognition of the similarity in these types of action
should be carried to its logical and just conclusion.
In the case where Smith wishes to reduce to judgment a con-
tract right against an absentee, Jones, the only objections, it
seems, are formal ones. As much justice can be effected, at
least, as in the transient motorist cases. In both instances, the
defendant is sought to be subjected to civil liability, and the
grounds for distingushing them are doubtful. Perhaps the
automobile is regarded as a dangerous instrumentality; but that,
it seems, might be a basis for criminal jurisdiction. Where the
plaintiff seeks money damages, what better position is he in
there than if his right were in contract?
In conclusion, we think that judgments in rem, at least in some
cases, ought to be recognized as vestigial remnants of medieval
times, of a time when symbolism was permitted to obstruct the
course of justice. We venture to suggest that our times are be-
yond such formal impediments and that our judges are capable
of looking at the interests of the people involved as the final
object of any legal decree. Judgments in personcm and in rem
should be recognized to be mere formulae, to some degree, at any
rate. They are the exteriors of the forms of action which have
grown up in our system of jurisprudence, and they should not be
allowed to obstruct the path of justice. People, their rights of
user in things, and their relationships toward each other are the
things which a lawsuit actually controls. The adjudication of
these things should not be interfered with by formulary
procedure.
MORRIS E. COHN, '29.
WHEN IS A PARTNERSHIP INSOLVENT WITHIN THE
TERMS OF THE PRESENT BANKRUPTCY ACT SO
AS TO BE ADJUDGED BANKRUPT?
May a partnership be insolvent under the present Bankruptcy
Act, when one of the partners is totally solvent i. e., is able to
pay his individual debts as well as all of the firm debts? This
question is one which many students of jurisprudence consider
settled in the negative. However, after a survey of the authori-
ties on the subject, a great conflict presents itself.
Before entering a discussion of this sort, it would be well to
draw the distinction between the terms "insolvent" and "bank-
rupt." The term "insolvent" is defined in the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, as follows: "A person shall be deemed insolvent within
the provisions of this title whenever the aggregate of his prop-
erty, exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed,
transferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss2/5
